Book II, a—c Socrates believes he has adequately responded to Thrasymachus and is through with the discussion of justice, but the others are not satisfied with the conclusion they have reached. Glaucon states that all goods can be divided into three classes: What Glaucon and the rest would like Socrates to prove is that justice is not only desirable, but that it belongs to the highest class of desirable things: Glaucon points out that most people class justice among the first group.
Adeimantus is also troubled by other aspects he wants introduced in the dialogue. In other words, Glaucon wishes to hear Socrates amplify his rebuttal of Thrasymachus, so Glaucon will recapitulate Thrasymachus' arguments. And Adeimantus intends to break new ground in the conversation.
Socrates has said that Justice is a good, a virtue, not unlike good health and forms of human knowledge that are good in and of themselves. The attainment of the good is not consequent on the rewards money, honor, prestige it might entail. But Glaucon's recapitulation of Thrasymachus' argument is of value, if only because it eschews the Sophist's bombast.
In the old days, there was no concept of justice, no laws to fix the locus of justice. People took by force of arms whatever they could from one another, but no group of people could ally themselves in sufficient force or philosophical consensus to assure their position of power.
So they were unhappy because everyone was effecting retribution of evil upon others who had instigated the use of force, violence for violence, blood feuds, the wrongs of fathers visited upon sons. So people agreed to a sort of rude law, tried to establish "right" actions and "wrong" actions. But their laws were engendered by fear and motivated by selfish ends.
Let us suppose Glaucon continues that each of two men possesses a magic ring that enables each man to become invisible. One of these men is a just man; the other is unjust. The men's invisibility-at-will enables them to do whatever they want, take whatever they want, seize any opportunity at will.
And given the opportunity, both men would seize it and exploit it; the unjust man will behave unjustly; the just man, given the opportunity, will also behave unjustly unless he is a simpleton.
Furthermore, Socrates has argued that justice is a virtue, that it is better in and of itself than injustice, no matter the circumstances. No, says Glaucon, it is more rewarding for the unjust man, reaping the benefits of injustice, to appear to be just, thereby incurring honors and reputation consequent upon the appearance of justice.
Moreover, Adeimantus chimes in with his brother, in attempting to fix a definition of justice, we have been talking about the ideal. In mundane reality, when fathers and teachers advise sons and students to strive for justice, they are actually advising the appearance of justice.
So Glaucon is correct, and Thrasymachus, in spite of his specious rhetoric, is probably correct. And even if we are reminded that we are taught that the gods themselves reward justice and punish injustice, we know from the stories the poets tell us that the gods can be bribed.
Perhaps we can fool the gods with appearance as well as the most of mankind. So in order for Socrates to demonstrate that justice is finally good in and of itself, and injustice commensurately bad, we need a furtherance of that argument.
Analysis Glaucon and Adeimantus have refined Thrasymachus' argument and have augmented it.
Now they want a more profound argument proving that, infinitely, justice qua justice is preferable to injustice as injustice. Furthermore, the two older brothers want Socrates to eschew any discussion of reputation of justice in his answer; for it has already been established that mankind generally mistakes the appearance of justice for justice.
The ideally unjust man is no simpleton, and he becomes adept at concealing his injustice under the guise of justice; no matter how hard he has to work at it, the rewards are great, and he is doubly rewarded in that he can enjoy the fruits of his injustice and at the same time he can enjoy the reputation of being a just man.- Plato's Republic Justified In Plato's Republic, Socrates leads a discussion with his fellow philosophers attempting to isolate the concept of justice in the soul.
In order to accomplish this task, they hypothesize that justice can occur both in the city as well as and the soul. Over the years Plato has been hailed by some as an advocate of women's rights because of some views he puts forth in The Republic.
In Book V of the work Plato has Socrates, acting as his voice, engage in a discussion of the perfect state with Polemarchus, Adeimantus, Glaucon, and Thrasymachus.
Glaucon's brother, Adeimantus, jumps in and says that Glaucon has missed something crucial. Adeimantus, playing the devil's advocate just like his brother, says that the reason why injustice so often appears to be better than justice is because the nature of justice and injustice are 1) poorly taught by parents and educators and 2) poorly represented in poetry and literature.
Understanding the Challenges of Glaucon and Adeimantus in Plato’s Republic A significantly large aspect of Plato’s dialogue entitled Republic is the discussion of the concept of justice.
On a preliminary note, the significance of such a concept makes itself manifest in our deepest questions concerning the many aspects of the political order. Understanding the Challenges of Glaucon and Adeimantus in Plato’s Republic Essay Outline and evaluate Darwin’s theory of Evolution Outline and evaluate the research into the effect of stress.
(Plato II 45) The foregoing discussion further strengthens the claim that was earlier presented; that the argument of the Republic is essentially, a moral one; since the challenge put forth by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II is also, by its very nature, moral.